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Name - awbvious
ENS - awbvious.eth
Tally - Tally | awbvious.eth
Interested in contribution -
DeFi
Improving Governance participation
Overall goal for the DAO -
Create a DAO that is not based based on how rich the person is. Governance should be quadratic voting (per Vitalik Buterin) mixed with constant vigilance on preventing sybilliism. Much DAO funding should go toward implementing quadratic voting and Dapps/projects that detect and slash sybil methods of gaming the system.
Sample Voting Issue 1 -
- Against
- Get rid of this part: “However, the remaining half of the grant would go completely to Flipside to run the program, including full salaries for seven staff members and partial salaries for another seven. It would then use the yield earned via the program to keep funding itself. Essentially, Flipside would leverage the Uniswap governance process to become the protocol’s official service provider of continuing education—and get paid for it. Moreover, the seven-member allocation committee, charged with generating a 30% return on the provided funds, and the three-member oversight committee, responsible for voting on whether the program should continue into a second year, both featured representation from Flipside, but no other analytics firms. If Flipside representatives voted as a block in either committee, they’d need only to convince one other member to vote alongside them in order to get their way.” $25 Million Uniswap Proposal Draws Ire of Crypto Community - Decrypt
- Term Limits / limit votes on issues with egregious personal benefit. Make any tradeoff for centralization temporary and make sure that authority does not also include the ability to make their authority permanent. Also if Flipside were given enough UNI to vote in their own favor on all matters, then make their vote invalid/weakened for anything in their favor. For example, a16z should not be allowed to vote on making Celo a chain supported by Uniswap–at least not with it’s entire stack (and again, Uniswap does not do quadratic voting, and it may be too late to put it in place). Celo had/has a tiny TVL and should not be the next chain Uniswap added when it did. Could a16z do some backroom shenanigans, convince others to vote, move their UNI around, sure… But a16z would likely draw attention to itself and a bad reputation worse than any benefit of adding Celo to Uniswap. Further, if tools were made ahead of time to prevent sybillism and quadratic voting, then a16z wouldn’t (ideally) even attempt it.
Sample voting issue 2 - reimbursement:
- It could be 1, 2, or 3 but taken on a case by case basis. If a DeFi dapp followed best practices and got exploited, then they may deserve 1, but that burden is high. For me: 1) very good bug bounty (e.g. immueifi for $1 million for critical, or more), 2) white hat protection if they follow proper white hat methods (e.g. jump crypto suggests Whitehats and Dropboxes but there are probably others), 3) Audits by quality auditors, 4) Audits on all upgrades too (this is going to be more expensive, and make the Dapp less agile, but so many exploits happen because they got audited and passed, but then did an upgrade with only a weak internal audit, or none at all–there may be exceptions, but need to be taken case by case), 5) Keeping on top of all forks that might have gotten exploited and/or exploits that could be used on them (e.g. Euler got hit with something that happened to EPMAX a month before, perhaps it was a trial run, considering their size/TVL should they have dedicated resources to look for any attack that could be used on them or by a fork? Do not know if EPMAX was a fork, but if so…). Those are just the top 5 I can think of. There are probably lots more. But that’s how it should be determined. If due diligence is performed, and no one could see it coming, well, yeah, if you can afford it, and you should be the team to do it, then do it. I have no idea if Arbitrum foundation is who should do the reimbursement, but I suppose that matters case-by-case. For example, if Arbitrum’s fraud proofs entered a exploit vector somehow, yeah, Arbitrum should reimburse everyone and anyone that got hit as much as possible.
Languages - English
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of interest -
None that I know of. I am not being paid by any crypto entity. I am not running any crypto projects. I am mostly just someone who reads a lot of crypto news and believes a lot in decentralization and would like to see DAOs be more than a rich-person-only game.
This information was sourced from https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/31/266
| Proposal | Votes for | Votes against | Voted? |
|---|---|---|---|
Executed Jun 8th, 2026 | 206.39M | 8.67M | No vote |
Executed May 11th, 2026 | 193.12M | 4.05K | No vote |
Executed Apr 20th, 2026 | 193.92M | 266.93K | No vote |
Executed Feb 23rd, 2026 | 247.89M | 362.6K | No vote |
Executed Dec 1st, 2025 | 263.67M | 16K | No vote |
| Proposal | Ballot |
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